

Approved For Release 1999/09/05 : CIA-RDP85T00075R000300020008-5

██████████ SCP 7-23-68-70 SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
9 APRIL 1970 CONFIDENTIAL

1 OF 1

STATSPEC

Confidential



SURVEY

of Communist Propaganda

Confidential

9 APRIL 1970
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

W A R N I N G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

C O N T E N T S

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

USSR Critical of U.S. Arms Decisions on Eve of SALT 1

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

L'HUMANITE Scores Yugoslav Journals' Support for Roger Garaudy . 3

THE USSR

Economic Discipline Campaign Produces Meager Results 5
Signs of Contention During and Following December Plenum
No Dismissals So Far for Plenum-related Shortcomings

COMMUNIST CHINA

County-level Young Communist League Committee Established . . . 11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 1 -

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

USSR CRITICAL OF U.S. ARMS DECISIONS ON EVE OF SALT

A continuing low volume of Moscow comment sustains the USSR's attack on U.S. plans for moving forward with the second phase of the Safeguard ABM system and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's). As in the past, Secretary Laird is singled out as the chief spokesman of the forces advocating deployment. TASS on 4 April, for example, observes that Laird in a recent interview "again favored an accelerated pace of manufacturing and stationing of new types of American offensive strategic weapons." TASS quotes him as saying that the United States will begin deploying land-based MIRV's in June and will follow this by fitting out submarines with MIRV's.

Two domestic service commentaries on the 5th--by Cheperov and Ignatyev--also note Laird's remarks on plans for land- and submarine-based MIRV's and question the meaning of the decisions on the weapons "on the eve" of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which will begin on 16 April. The Ignatyev commentary goes on to note the "constructive and reassuring attitude" of the USSR toward the talks and concludes that "good will" must be demonstrated by both sides to assure agreement. (Podgornyy in an interview published on 6 April in Tokyo's YOMIURI--but apparently not carried by Soviet media--cited the "limitation of the strategic arms race" as one of several disarmament measures "ripe for solution," but he did not mention the upcoming talks.)

The third issue of the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY--signed to the press on 11 March--carries articles by V. Larionov and A. Khlebnikov voicing concern over pressures in the United States for stepped-up weapons development while preparations are being made for SALT. The Larionov article, which discusses at considerable length the on-going debate in Washington over ABM's and MIRV's, says that a choice must be made between the continuing of the former policy of building up armaments and exacerbating international tension and the seeking of paths toward mutually acceptable agreements. In Larionov's words, this choice is becoming particularly vital with SALT approaching and "in this sense it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the victory of one or another of the opposing forces in the United States which are participating in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 2 -

strategic debates." Khlebnikov's article, treating the broad question of U.S.-Soviet relations, cites the U.S. press for the opinion that the "feverish efforts" to launch new weapons programs on the eve of the Vienna talks "are something in the nature of a diplomatic maneuver designed to insure for the United States more favorable positions at the negotiations." If this is the case, the author observes, "these maneuvers by no means testify to the farsightedness of American policy."

Moscow continues to publicize calls in the United States for a freeze on deployment of ABM's and MIRV's. The domestic service on the 9th, for example, reports that former presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy the day before recommended to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee on disarmament that the United States suspend "development of Safeguard and MIRV's" as a means of creating "favorable prerequisites" for the Vienna talks. TASS on 8 April says that Senate Democrats have recommended Senate approval of the pending resolution on "halting further deployment of nuclear weapons systems" and have suggested that President Nixon submit such an "initiative" at Vienna. And TASS on 6 April reports that the non-governmental American Assembly on Arms Limitation has urged the President to delay for at least six months MIRV deployment and postpone the second phase of Safeguard.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 3 -

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

L'HUMANITE SCORES YUGOSLAV JOURNALS' SUPPORT FOR ROGER GARAUDY

Expressions of support in the Yugoslav press for French communist dissident Roger Garaudy's challenge to ideological orthodoxy appear to be causing embarrassment to the French Communist Party (PCF). An editorial in the PCF organ L'HUMANITE on 3 April, responding to "slanders" against the party published in the Belgrade weekly NIN and the Zagreb cultural weekly SPEKTAR, accuses both journals of "crudely interfering in the PCF's internal affairs in the name of 'anti-Stalinism' and 'antidogmatism.'" In effect chastising the Yugoslav party for tolerating the publication of such articles, the editorial adds that "for its part the PCF follows the rule of noninterference in the affairs of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and will not hesitate to demand that this rule should be respected by others every time this proves necessary."

The PCF, anxious to play down the Garaudy affair, may be particularly upset because Yugoslav expressions of solidarity with the French CP maverick have been picked up in the French noncommunist press. LE MONDE carried a report on the two Yugoslav articles on 3 April.

REBUTTAL OF YUGOSLAV CHARGES

The L'HUMANITE editorial is devoted chiefly to a rebuttal of attacks on the PCF in NIN by the Yugoslav Marxist philosopher Predrag Vranicki.* L'HUMANITE indignantly rejects charges by Vranicki that the PCF used Stalinist methods at its 19th congress in February, when it ousted Garaudy from the party Politburo and

* Professor Vranicki is a member of the editorial board of the nonconformist Zagreb philosophical bimonthly PRAXIS and is the author of "A History of Marxism," which is distinctly anti-Soviet in tone. On 27 January PRAVDA attacked Vranicki by name in an article which put him in the same "revisionist" category as Garaudy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 4 -

Central Committee for his "anti-Soviet" and "revisionist" views. The paper insists, on the contrary, that Garaudy was treated in the best traditions of "proletarian and Leninist democracy." Assailing the Yugoslav weekly TELEGRAM--of which SPEKTAR is a supplement--for devoting an entire issue of SPEKTAR to Garaudy and the development of his thought, the editorial points to the weekly's expressed hope that the Garaudy case "will come to a positive conclusion and will bring an end to dogmatic usurpations." L'HUMANITE asks: "What is this but an incitement to an opposition struggle within our party?"

The editorial also vehemently rejects an allegation by Vranicki that the PCF missed a golden opportunity during the May-June 1968 French student disturbances to form an alliance with the rebels and to establish "an advanced democratic regime." The same charge has been made by Garaudy in his latest book, "The Whole Truth," which has been given wide publicity in the Western press. L'HUMANITE responds defensively by blaming the noncommunist left for rejecting an alliance of "workers and democratic forces." It obscures the fact that during the disturbances the PCF took an openly hostile attitude toward the student rebels, labeling them "false revolutionaries."

YUGOSLAV SYMPATHY FOR GARAUDY

Party officials in Belgrade have remained silent on the Garaudy affair, but Yugoslav media have followed developments in the case in some detail and have aired Garaudy's views, which include condemnation of the intervention in Czechoslovakia and support for differing models of socialism. When he visited Yugoslavia in September 1969 to "study the Yugoslav self-management system," Garaudy was reported by Yugoslav media to have been received by Executive Bureau member Todorovic. The Yugoslav party theoretical organ KOMUNIST published a lengthy interview with Garaudy on 4 September 1969 in which he expounded on "the crisis of socialism" and lavishly praised the Yugoslav model as having "universal significance." He went on to note that "he was fortunate to encounter great understanding in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia"--a sentiment that evidently has not been lost on the PCF.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 5 -

THE USSR

ECONOMIC DISCIPLINE CAMPAIGN PRODUCES MEAGER RESULTS

As of the beginning of April, the campaign against economic mismanagement initiated by the 15 December Central Committee plenum has largely turned into a drive for heightened efficiency and stricter labor discipline. The criticisms of individuals, party organizations, and ministries at the plenum and the subsequent warnings in the press against unnamed leaders have resulted in official rebukes to a handful of party and government officials. But if the campaign was intended to shake up the entrenched party and government bureaucracy and inject new blood into the leadership of the lagging economy, it has thus far failed.

The apparent ineffectiveness of the campaign as a purge instrument reinforces the oligarchic character of the present Central Committee. With no major shakeups since the last party congress in 1966, the Central Committee to be elected at the upcoming 24th Congress promises to be virtually identical in composition to the present one. Of 195 voting Central Committee members, only about 15 have died or been demoted since 1966. Five candidate members were promoted to full membership at the April 1968 plenum, and the remaining vacancies will presumably be filled by those currently occupying posts entitled to membership (three new republic first secretaries--Latvia, Azerbaydzhan, and Turkmenia--and about 10 major oblast first secretaries--Gorkiy, Rostov, Perm, Primorye, and so forth). Even with an expansion of membership the new Central Committee seems unlikely to reach past levels of renewal. The 195-member Central Committee elected in 1966 included 56 new members, 29 percent of the membership, and the 175-member committee elected at the 1961 congress included 109 new members, 62 percent new.

Signs of Contention During and Following December Plenum

The conduct of the December plenum and the postplenum campaign were accompanied by signs of indecision and conflict. The plenum produced the weakest endorsement of Politburo activity since such endorsements were initiated in December 1966. The Central Committee merely "approved the activity of the Politburo." This was a much weaker endorsement than in the past, when the committee was reported as "fully and wholly" approving the "political line and practical activity" of the Politburo (December 1966, April 1968, and June 1969 plenums), "fully" approving the Politburo's "political

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 6 -

line and practical activity" (June 1967), "fully and wholly" approving Politburo activity in foreign affairs (July 1968), or "unanimously" approving and "fully" supporting Politburo activity (October 1968). Some local leaders subsequently distorted this endorsement by asserting that the plenum had "unanimously" approved the "practical activity" of the Politburo (Azerbaijdzhan First Secretary Aliyev in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 27 December).

The propaganda treatment of the plenum and Brezhnev's speech also reflected contention. Initially little was said about the plenum, and, in line with previous practice, Brezhnev's speech at the plenum was not published.* His speech, called a "communication," was not treated as a major address, although some pro-Brezhnev keynoters at republic central committee plenums did hint at its importance.** The 26 December Komsomol plenum ignored the December plenum, and local plenums in late December and early January routinely approved the December plenum and its endorsement of Politburo activity.

A sharp change took place in the second week of January when, almost a month after the plenum, the importance of Brezhnev's speech was upgraded, and a press campaign against unspecified irresponsible and undisciplined leaders began. Where republic and oblast plenums through early January had approved the Politburo's activities and the December plenum's work, starting on 8 January local meetings began approving the "conclusions and tasks" laid out in Brezhnev's speech.

This new formula was initiated by PRAVDA's 8 January report that the Moscow city party aktiv meeting had approved the decisions of the plenum and Supreme Soviet session and the conclusions and

* Only one of Brezhnev's nine plenum speeches since the December 1966 plenum has been published, that in October 1968 on agriculture.

** Azerbaijdzhan First Secretary Aliyev declared that Brezhnev had "realistically" evaluated the economic situation and exposed shortcomings (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 27 December); Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev stated that Brezhnev's speech had outlined a program of action (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 December); and Moldavian Secretary Melkov reported that Brezhnev's "deep and profound speech" had formulated the practical tasks for 1970 and would be widely discussed in party organizations (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 4 January).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 7 -

tasks laid out in Brezhnev's speech. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA's 8 January account of the aktiv meeting, however, reported only approval of the plenum and Supreme Soviet session decisions and Politburo activity. Moscow City First Secretary Grishin had "dwelt in detail" on the conclusions and tasks contained in Brezhnev's "communication," the paper reported, but only on 10 January did a MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA editorial add that the aktiv had also approved the conclusions and tasks set out in Brezhnev's "speech."

At the 8 January Georgian plenum Mzhavanadze declared that Georgia would be guided by the conclusions and tasks laid out in Brezhnev's speech (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 10 January), and on 10 January PRAVDA reported that the Moscow oblast aktiv and Kiev oblast aktiv had also approved the conclusions and tasks of Brezhnev's speech. From then on, reports of approval of the December plenum and Brezhnev's speech largely replaced references to approval of the December plenum and Politburo activity. The shift was especially clear in the Ukrainian oblast meetings held between 10 and 31 January.

Mid-January saw the sudden start of a campaign publicizing the themes raised at the December plenum. PRAVDA published editorials on this topic on 10 and 13 January, IZVESTIYA on 15 January, RURAL LIFE and SOVIET RUSSIA on 16 January, ECONOMIC GAZETTE on 19 and 26 January, and PARTY LIFE (No. 3) on 20 January.

At the same time a series of sharp warnings against unnamed leaders who fail to fulfill plans and do not observe state discipline began: By People's Control Committee Deputy Chairman V. Zaluzhnyy in the 8 January IZVESTIYA, by Leningrad City First Secretary G.I. Popov at the Leningrad aktiv meeting reported in the 8 January PRAVDA and PARTY LIFE No. 3, in Mzhavanadze's 8 January Georgian plenum speech in the 10 January ZARYA VOSTOKA, and in the 10 January and 13 January PRAVDA editorials on the December plenum. Simultaneously, reports of oblast and republic aktiv meetings and plenums discussing the December plenum began stressing local shortcomings (Tula, Krasnodar, and Smolensk in the 11 January PRAVDA, Rostov in the 11 January SOVIET RUSSIA, Kiev in the 20 January RUDYANSKA UKRAINA, and so forth).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 8 -

No Dismissals So Far For Plenum-related Shortcomings

It is clear from the statements in January and subsequently that specific leaders and organizations were criticized at the plenum. Latvian First Secretary Voss declared that "shortcomings in the activities of individual officials" were criticized at the plenum (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 21 January). PRAVDA's 13 January editorial indicated that Gosplan and several ministries had been criticized. Immediately after the plenum Gosplan Chairman Baybakov had even raised the possibility that ministerial-level officials might be dismissed.*

But while several officials have lost their posts since the plenum, the removals appear unconnected with the plenum. Few of those replaced have been criticized at all. A 24 December Turkmen Central Committee plenum did release First Secretary Ovezov for "serious shortcomings"; but these shortcomings were not linked with any accusations of poor economic leadership, and no other Turkmen officials have been removed. The 1969 lag in Turkmenia's industrial growth** seems not to have been the reason for his dismissal, because it was precisely the leaders in charge of industry who were promoted at the time of Ovezov's fall: Turkmen Central Committee industry secretary O.N. Orazmukhamedov was promoted to premier in December 1969, and the deputy premier for industry, B. Geldyyev, was promoted to succeed him as Central Committee secretary for industry in January.

* Without directly referring to plenum criticism, Baybakov urged raising the "personal responsibility of leaders of ministries and departments of the USSR and republics and of enterprises and economic organizations for failure to fulfill plans," applying to them "strict measures," including dismissal (AGITATOR, No. 1, 1970, assembled for press on 23 December).

** "For the first time in many years" Turkmenia in 1969 did not fulfill its industrial production plan, falling short by six percent, and industrial growth was only one percent instead of the planned 9.4 percent (First Secretary Gapurov, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 7 March 1970). On the other hand, Turkmenia overfulfilled its petroleum production plan (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 March) and by 29 October 1969 had fulfilled its five-year cotton plan in four years (Gapurov, TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 7 March).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 9 -

At a 25 December Azerbaydzhan Supreme Soviet session the Azerbaydzhan president was replaced, and Azerbaydzhan Central Committee Secretary Kyazimov was fired for "serious shortcomings" in March. These moves, however, seemed simply to be followups to the purge of Azerbaydzhan leaders begun in July-August 1969.

In late December Smolensk First Secretary Kalmyk was transferred to the post of RSFSR first deputy procurement minister (PRAVDA, 30 December)--a demotion but not a disgrace. Although agricultural shortcomings in Smolensk had been exposed a year earlier, there has been no direct criticism of Kalmyk's leadership.*

PRAVDA on 15 January announced V.G. Bakayev's replacement as Merchant Marine Minister and on 16 January V.P. Zotov's replacement as Food Industry Minister. Bakayev was 68 and Zotov 71, however, and both were retired on pension (see TRUD and IZVESTIYA); no criticism of their leadership has been published.

The most serious attacks on specific leaders and organizations occurred in February, but no casualties have been reported. The Central Committee condemned the leaders of Voronezh oblast and of the meat and dairy industry ministry for failures expressly associated with the December plenum--the first such charges--but these leaders have been permitted to acknowledge their shortcomings and promise to improve.

A 3 February SOVIET RUSSIA editorial assailed the Voronezh bureau for poor agricultural leadership, and PRAVDA and RURAL LIFE on 22 February revealed that the Central Committee had recently heard a report by the Voronezh leaders and had adopted a resolution declaring it unsatisfactory. The press on 22 February reported a Voronezh plenum where the oblast leaders admitted their errors. A 19 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY editorial reported a Central Committee attack on the leadership of the meat and dairy industry ministry. Because the decree was only a Central Committee decree instead of a joint Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree, technically it was a condemnation of the work of the ministry's party committee, which is responsible to the Central Committee. But the decree also condemned the "serious omissions" by the ministry's leaders and censured the party committee for not reporting to the Central Committee the shortcomings of certain

* See FBIS SURVEY for 15 January 1970, pp 22-25.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 10 -

ministerial officials "regardless of their posts." On 22 February PRAVDA reported a meeting of the ministry's party members where the "correct" conclusions were drawn and some members of the ministry's collegium were attacked. A 25 February PRAVDA editorial cited the decree as an object lesson for all ministry party committees and stressed the need for party committees to play a bigger role in their ministries.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers also began harshly censuring local authorities for violations of economic discipline, attacking the Tomsk executive committee for neglecting checking (SOVIET RUSSIA, 4 February) and the Kursk executive committee for disrupting deliveries (SOVIET RUSSIA, 18 March). No punishment has been announced so far in these cases either.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 11 -

COMMUNIST CHINA

COUNTY-LEVEL YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

On 5 April Harbin radio broadcast several items of reportage on the formation of the Hulin county committee of the Young Communist League (YCL) under the leadership and discipline of the local party structure. Although the rebuilding of the YCL was specifically ordered in last year's 1 July joint editorial from Peking, on the 40th anniversary of the CCP, this is the first official report on establishment of a county or higher-level YCL committee since the Ninth CCP Congress ended. In fact, only Nanking has previously claimed concrete progress in rebuilding the league. On 11 September last year Nanking radio reported on a newly established YCL branch for a production brigade in Kiangsu province.

Hulin county includes the Chenpao island area, and the propaganda makes the point, succinctly, that this first YCL county committee in Heilungkiang has been established in the nation's "outpost against revisionism." Hulin was also the first county in Heilungkiang to set up a CCP committee, on 9 February. The CCP committee, it is reported, provided leadership in rebuilding the Hulin YCL committee in order to prevent the youth "from departing from the leadership of the party and becoming independent." The actual organizational work was carried out by the county party core group, which made arrangements and conducted investigations. After five months of work, "YCL organizations of many basic units have been comprehensively established" and the YCL county committee formed.

The leadership role of the Hulin county party committee over the YCL was spelled out in an article by the party committee which portrayed the YCL, in precultural revolution terms, as an organization under full control of senior party cadres and dedicated to the proper upbringing of potential cadres. A member of the Hulin county party committee standing committee will be responsible for YCL organization in the county and will coordinate league tasks on the party committee's working agenda, receive reports on league work, and visit basic league organizations "to sum up and popularize their working experiences."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY
9 APRIL 1970

- 12 -

Local party units are to exercise leadership over league cadres by giving "them a free hand in their work to enable them to dare to bear responsibility" but to "control them in practice to enable them to develop" under the guidance of the party's political line. League work is to be linked with the party's central task, while also allowing "independent activities for the young people according to their special characteristics." Party committees must, however, provide training and education for league members and "lead the YCL organizations to educate the league members and other young people" on class struggle so they will grow into acceptable "revolutionary" successors.

Delegates from the CCP Heilungkiang provincial core group and the Provincial Revolutionary Committee attended the first plenary session of the YCL committee. A HEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial termed the new committee "a major event" in the political life of league members in the province and called for continued "open-door league consolidation" in conjunction with further building of the CCP.

Central media have made no mention so far of the Hulin county YCL committee.

CONFIDENTIAL